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PARTITION OF A VESSEL IN ADMIRALTY.
That interest in affairs of the sea is not entirely confined to
those whose occupations bring them into business relations with
vessels, leaks out now and then by the inventories of estates filed
in our Probate Court.
It is seldom that an old resident dies in one of our port towns,
that you do not find, listed in the inventory of his estate, interests
in some old schooners.
Clergymen, too, have been known to take flyers in various
kinds of wind-jammers all the way from the little chasers of the
sacred codfish to the large carriers of the black diamonds.
Such investments, while generally made to help some friend
who is trying to get up a vessel, are frequently made because of
a fascination for the sea and to own in a vessel that is trading all
around the world, and to watch her ports of entry and discharge,
and speculate a bit upon how much she will make if she has a
good charter, and shiver a bit if a storm is reported from about
where you think she must be.
But it does not seem to make any difference whether the sixty-
fourth interest of the schooner is owned by a landsman who built
in her for his love of the mystery of the sea and alluring experience
of one of his friends who has had good luck in some schooner, or
by one who has more or less practical knowledge of vessels and
builds in them, more for what he can supply them with, than for
the interest he expects to receive from the investment- like sail-
makers, drydock men, etc., for all are alike in the idea that if they
don't like the management all they have to do is to ask the Ad-
miralty Court to partition the schooner and give them their parts.
During the past few years I have been requested very often by
lawyers and laymen to bring a suit to partition this schooner, bark
or steamer, and when I have asked how much does your client
own, or how much do you own, as the case may be, I have been in-
variably met by questions like these: "Why, does that make any
difference?" "What does that have to do with it '?"
The idea that you can ask for the division of a vessel no mat-
ter what part you own, no doubt prevails because this is the rule
that applies to chattels and real estate, and to vessels if the State
Court gives the right to such an action. You may partition a yes-
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sel in some of the State Courts if the vessel is within the waters of
the state, just as you do chattels, by having a receiver appointed
and having the vessel sold. In such cases it is not necessary that
the one applying for the receiver should own any particular part
of the vessel, but the courts have held that one must own more
than one sixty-fourth interest.
But admiralty will not take jurisdiction for the partition and
licitation of a vessel unless there are equal part owners who cannot
agree and their differences are irreconcilable. Some of my brother
lawyers, when they have requested me to act as counsel for them
in such matters, have referred me to "Benedict on Admiralty," page
520, which either through some oversight or typographical error
intimates that the 13artition and licitation of a vessel can be brought
into admiralty between unequal owners.
The reason why owners must be equal to have the Court take
jurisdiction of a licitation and partition suit, must be apparent if
one stops to think. If the owners are unequal, the majority can
rule and there is no need of a partition; but if they are equal and
disagree, neither can compel the other to give way, and the only
thing the Court can do is to decree a sale of the vessel and divide
the proceeds between the owners. ("Hughes on Admiralty," p. 297).
The cases upon this question are very few, and the text writers
touch it but briefly. The reason is obvious, for itis very seldom
that you get a case where there are equal part owners.
When the proper facts do present themselves in a case for
partition and licitation, namely, equal part owners who can't agree
and are in irreconcilable conflict and you obtain the jurisdiction of
the United States District Court, two very important and interest-
ing questions are presented.
First: Is a suit for partition and licitation of a vessel such
a case that the claimant can give a bond and obtain a release of
the vessel?
Second: Has the Court jurisdiction to order an accounting
between the owners as a part of the suit for partition and licitation?
FIRST.
The first question is evidently one within the discretion of the
Court, for in Supreme Court Rule ii, which is as follows:
"In like manner, where any ship shall be arrested, the same
may, upon the application of the claimant, be delivered to him upon
a due appraisement, to be had under the direction of the court, up-
on the claimant's depositing in court so much money as the court
shall order, or upon his giving a stipulation, with sureties; as afore-
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
said; and if the claimant shall decline any such application then the
Court may, in its discretion, upon the application of either party,
upon due cause shown, order a sale of such or otherwise dispose of,
as it may deem most for the benefit of all concerned ;" in the sec-
ond line, the Supreme Court uses the word "may," and
evidently intended by the use of this word that there were
some cases where a bond should not be taken until the case was
first presented to the court. It was contended in The Emma B.,
14o Fed. 770, a recent case argued in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey which was -a case for the par-
tition and licitation of a schooner between equal part owners who
were unable to agree upon the management and employment of the
schooner, that this was a case where the discretion of the Court
should be exercised in refusing to accept a bond, for what is asked
for in such a case is that the vessel be sold and it is obvious that
if any bonds are taken and the vessel released, the very thing which
the Court is asked to partition would not be in the custody of the
Court, and the only thing that would be left would be a piece of
paper; but Judge Cross, who heard the case held that a bond might
be given to the Marshal releasing the schooner, providing it con-
tained a condition to re-deliver her to the Marshal within ten days
after a decree of the Court, ordering the sale and partition.
In the case of Burr v. The St. Thomas, Fed Cas. No. 219 4 A,
which was a case between equal owners who could not agree as to
her control and employment, upon application to the court her
sale was ordered with a division of the proceeds.
To the same effect is The Vincennes, Fed. Cas. No. 16944. In
this case there were three part owners; one owned one-half and
the other two one-quarter each. The owner of the one-half was
in possession and was ship's husband, but the parties could not
agree as to the voyage and upon application of the two one-quar-
ter owners joining together, the vessel was ordered to be sold.
But in neither of these cases does it appear whether a request
was made that the vessel be released on a bond during the pendency
of the suit for licitation, so the decision of Judge Cross in The
Emma B. evidently settles a novel question.
The text writers don't seem to express any opinion as to
whether vessels under libel in a partition suit should be released on
bonds as is the custom in other admiralty cases.
"Henry on Admiralty" comes perhaps the nearest of any to ex-
pressing an opinion, for he says at section 124, page 339, "but the
claimant will not be entitled to have a vessel discharged from ar-
rest where it would defeat the very object of the suit."
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SECOND.
It is unquestionably the law that Admiralty will not take juris-
diction of mere matters of account, but in a suit for partition and
licitation between equal part owners of which the Court has juris-
diction, it will order an accounting as incidental to the main ac-
tion.
The reason for this must be apparent, for if a vessel were sold
in a partition suit and the money paid into Court to be divided be-
tween the two owners and there are any liens against the vessel,
such lienors would have the right to file petitions for the proceeds
of the sale. This would be most unjust to the libellant to submit
his part of the proceeds of the sale to payment of liens without first
ascertaining whether there are earnings belonging to the vessel,
for if there are, they should be applied to the payment of such
liens before libellant's share of the proceeds of the sale is touched
for such purposes. Then, too, it would be a very imperfect ad-
ministration of justice to decree to the libellant in such case half
of the proceeds of the sale of the vessel in the registry of the court
without any account of the earnings of the vessel and leave him to
bring a suit for an accounting in some other tribunal, which might
be incompetent to do justice between the parties and consequently
such suit would prove entirely ineffectual.
It is more than likely also that, if the libellant did obtain a
judgment in some other court for an accounting, respondent
would have put the money received from his share of the proceeds
of the sale of the vessel beyond the reach of courts. Libellant
would then be in this position. Supposing the respondent had been
running the vessel for two or -three years without rendering any ac-
count, his part of the proceeds of the sale might be partly used up
to pay liens on the vessel, although there might be more than
enough earnings due the vessel to pay such liens, and he would
have to try to collect such earnings of the respondent in some other
court when it might have all been settled in the partition suit where
the proceeds of the sale of the vessel were, and where the respond-
ent could have been denied the right to take his part of the proceeds
of the sale of the vessel out of the registry of the Court unless he
did render an account.
An interesting case on the question which has just been de-
cided is The Emma B., i4o Fed. 77i. In this case, ex-
ceptions were filed to a libel for partition and licitation because an
accounting was asked for incidentally to the main cause of action.
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Judge Cross, in a very careful opinion in overruling the exceptions
said:
"It is undoubtedly established that a Court of Admiralty has
no jurisdiction of accounts as such, and will not take jurisdiction of
a cause, solely for the purpose of decreeing an accounting,
but I do not find any case which holds that where jurisdiction is
acquired on valid grounds, and the accounting is merely incidental
to the main relief, that such accounting will be denied. Indeed, it
seems to be recognized in many cases that an accounting incidental
to the main question, is not only permissible, but may even be es-
sential to the proper administration of justice."
If the respondent in The Emma B., supra, had sold his interest
even after the libel was filed, the libel against such respondent
would be dismissed and with it of course, any right to an account-
ing against him in the action for partition. The reason for this is
because just as soon as the respondent parted with his interest the
Court lost jurisdiction so far as he was concerned, and losing juris-
diction of him in the partition suit it lost jurisdiction of compelling
him to render an account, for Admiralty will not take jurisdiction
simply of accountings. The buyer of his interest would stand in
his place for all purposes both for the partition and the accounting,
but the original respondent by selling his interest would practically
defeat the action of accounting in the partition suit, because of
course the vessel when under attachment would have earned
nothing after he sold her. If what I have suggested should be fol-
lowed by respondents in all actions for partition and licitation, libel-
lants would practically be compelled to go to other tribunals to
get an accounting in such cases.
In The John E. Mulford, 18 Fed. 445, an action was brought
to obtain the partition and sale of a schooner between equal part
owners. There were two respondents, one who was the former
managing owner of the schooner, owning a half interest, and the
one to whom he had sold his interest. Judge Brown, who for so
many years presided over the Admiralty Court in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, dismissed the action against the former man-
aging owner because such action, so far as it applied to him, was
for an accounting pure and simple and held that the Admiralty had
no jurisdiction of such an action. But as to the other respondent,
the owner, he held that the Court had jurisdiction to determine the
account of the receipts of the vessel's earnings as an incident to
the just distribution of the sale of the vessel now in the registry
of the Court, and said upon this question at page 458 of the opinion:
"If, as is claimed by the libellant, this defendant has a consid-
PARTITION OF A VESSEL IN ADMIRALTY.
erable sum in his hands as the proceeds of these earnings, it would
be a very imperfect administration of justice to decree to the de-
fendant the full half of the proceeds of the vessel in the registry
without any account of the excess of her earnings belonging to
the libellant already in this claimant's possession, and to turn the
libellant over to a future and possibly ineffectual action in another
court to recover these earnings. There -is no want of power as I
understand, in this Court as a Court of Admiralty to- take such
an account as an incident to the principal cause of which it has
undoubted jurisdiction when justice requires such an account in
order to make a just distribution of a fund in the registry of the
court."
In Davis v. Child, Fed. Cas. No. 3628, 2 Ware, 78, it
was held that Admiralty has no jurisdiction over matters of ac-
count merely as accounts, although they may arise exclusively out
of maritime transactions. It can, however, take cognizance of ac-
counts where they are incidental to other matters over which it has
jurisdiction.
In the case of Tunna v. The Betsina, Fed. Cas. No. 14236,
it was held that Admiralty will not order an account as a separate
and independent mode of relief but will, where the same is only an
incident to another matter of which it has admitted cognizance.
In the case of The Larch, Fed. Cas. No. 8o86, 3 Ware,
34, it was held by Judge Ware that where there are accounts ris-
ing incidentally in the case, it is a question addressed to the sound
discretion of the court whether it will take cognizance of the ac-
count or not. I speak of this case because from its citation in
certain cases and text-books, it would appear that this case has
been overruled on the point that admiralty will take cognizance of
accounts where they are incidental to an action over which the
Court has jurisdiction, but this is not so, and whatever may have
been overruled in the case on appeal, this statement by Judge Ware,
that Admiralty will consider accounts where they arise incidentally
in a case over which the Court has jurisdiction was not, for Judge
Curtis, hearing this case on appeal in the Circuit Court, Fed. Cas.
No. 8o85, 2 Curtis. 427, held that no lien exists in such cases
unless the owners be also partners, and if it did exist it would not
be enforced in Admiralty as a single and independent subject of
account.
The text writers are in entire accord with the decisions, and
hold that an account, as merely incidental to the sale and partition
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of a vessel over which the Court has jurisdiction, should be de-
termined in the same action.
"Henry on Admiralty" says the following at page 66:
"But in the exercise of this jurisdiction it may take an ac-
count when such accounting is only incidental, and an account can
be taken of the vessel's earnings against a former managing part
owner, who is also a claimant on the fund and entitled to share in
the proceeds of the sale of a vessel under a decree in the case; as
an incident to the just distribution of the proceeds." ("Benedict on
Admiralty," p. 141-142, section 263a; "Hughes on Admiralty,"
P- 353-354, section 189).
The decisions I believe, follow what .the Supreme Court evi-
dently intended, that District Courts sitting in Admiralty should
take equitable as well as legal action in the distribution of funds
in the registry of the Court, for it provided for it in rule 43 when it
said, "to proceed summarily to hear and decide thereon, and to de-
cree therein according to law and justice."
James D. Dewell, Jr.
